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[51 C.2d 655; 335 P.2d 669]

[Crim. No. 6376.
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Feb. 27, 1959.]

'rHE PEOPLE, Appellant, v. WILLIAM G. BERNSTEIN,
Respondent.
[1] Delinquent Children-Contributing to Delinquency-Nature of
Crime.-The crime of contributing to the delinquency of a
minor is not concerned with the conduct of adults except for
the effect it
tend to have on the child.
[2] !d.-Contributing to Delinquency-Test.-The test of the crime
of contributing to the delinquency of a minor is the reasonable effect the charged acts have on children, not what conclusions can be drawn by adults; it is defendant's conduct in
the presence of the children that is the
of the prosecution.
[3] !d.-Contributing to Delinquency--Scope of Statute.-W elf. &
Inst. Code, § ·702, making it a misdemeanor to contribute to
the delinquency of a minor, may be construed as referring
exclusively to acts or omissions done or made directly with
relation to the child. Lascivious acts committed in the presence of a child capable of comprehension or toward the child,
immoral relations with the child or other acts that may directly
cause, tend to cause or contribute to its dependency are within
the scope of the statute, but something done solely with relation to somebody else, in no way directly affecting the child,
may not fairly be held within its scope regardless of whether
the thing so done is immoral or absolutely free from blame.
[ 4] !d.-Contributing to Delinquency- Particul~.r Acts.-Where
the only conduct in the presence of an 8-year-old child consisted of defendant's presence in the child's home, his being
on the bed with the child's mother when the lights were probably on, and being seen on his way to the shower dressed in
his underclothing and shoes, evidence thereof did not constitute proof of acts on defendant's part tending to cause
the child to lead an immoral life.
[5] !d.-Contributing to Delinquency-Indictment and Information.-Assuming that the relationship between defendant and
an 8-year-old child's mother (a divorcee) was contrary to
good monlls, it was proper to set aside an information charging defendant with contributing to the delinquency of the child
where there was no evidence that defendant's acts committed
in the child's presence had any untoward effect on the child.
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Delinquent Children, § 27 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1, 2] Delinquent Children, § 20; [3]
Delinquent Children, § 21; [4] Delinquent Children, § 24; [5] Delinquent Children, § 27 (1); [6] Indictment and Information, § 90;
[7] Delinquent Children, § 27.

cause
defendant to ans\Yer.

order of the
an inforrnation.

Court of Presno
Arthur C. Shepard,

Affirmed.
Clarence A. Linn,
E. Clad{e
District
J. Hoth, Deputy District

Leo lL Pricclman for
from an
G. Bernstein,
a licensed and
and surgeon.
Ile was accused by information of two counts of contributof eertaiu minon>
& Inst.
on two dates
''did live ~with 1\It·s.
and wife" in the presence of the two
conduct ''caused and
tended to cause and encourage . . .
minor children] . . . to come within the provisions of Section 700 of the \Velfare and Institutions Code of
the State of
to-wit: To become or remain minor
~William

[ 6] Sec Cal.Jur.2d, Indictment and
Indictment and
§ 14:3.

§83; Am.Jur.,

V. BERNSTEIN
P.2d 6G9l

8~

stein;
he called llim "Doe"; that Dr. Bernstein lmt1 como
to his homo '' prett:v often''; that he eamo to the house ''Sometimes . . . in the
and sometimes he comes in the
and
"; that he could hear D1·. Bcn1stein eome in
''and then talk to m.\and then I don't lwar them do
e1s<>. Just talk." He testified
he didn't think
Dr. Bernstein eYer
all
:fiiic-had fnrthcr testified
that thrrc \Yere two bedrooms in the
h:v~ his mother and one
himself.
Midwel also testifird that ''just once'' he had seen Dr.
Berm;kin on his way to take a shower one
and that
he was dressed "in hif>
and his T-~:hirt and
his
shoes
on"; that it >Yas"
';that Dr. Bernstein
came from his mother's bedroom; that his mother was either
in the bedroom or the kitchen and that she was dn'sse\l iu her
pajamas and robe. He also testified that onee
he had
eome in from play in the afternoon about 4 o'elotk he had
his mother's
the door of whieh
open
about a
nnd that he had seen his mother and Dr Bernstein on the heel; that
~were "just
tlwre"; that his
mother had a lwadaehe; that he didn't know ~whether the
~were on or off but he thought they were on; that he had seen
Dr. Drrnstein in his mother's room "
a few times" but
OIH·e on tlw bed. He also testified that onec Dr. Bernstein
had
mother some money to
Chrisirnas toys.
oJ' the evidt•uee and
oral
*'I'he eomplaint against Mrs. Enns was dismissed after the information
against Dr. Bernstein was set aside.

658

PEOPLE

BEiiN"STEIX

[•31 C.2d

argument of counsel, the trial court granted defeudant 's motion to set aside the information on the ground of lack of
reasonable or probable cause.
The People contend that the trial eourt c:annot usurp the
funetion of the
magistrate
its
as to the
of: the cviclencc as
soine evidence m support of the infornu1tion;
reasonable
from the eYidcncc that a crime has been
committed
with a reasonable
that the defendant committed the crime is sufficient to hold him to
answer.
[1) rfhc crime ·with 1vhieh we are here COlWcrned is contributing to the delinquency of a minor child; we are not concerued with the conduct of Dr. Bcrn~'tein and Mrs. Enns except insofar as the effect it might teml to have on the minor
children involved. [2] 'l'hc test is the reasonable effect the
charged acts have upon children, not what conclusions can be
dravm therefrom by adults (People v. JJliller, ].1;) Cal.App.2d
473, 477 [302 P.2d G03] ). It should also be remembered that
it is the defendant's conduct in the presence of the children
that is the
of the action. [3] A good statement of the
rule is found in the concurring opinion of Mr. Chief ,Jn;;iice
1n
Y.
i, 172 Cai. 717, 723, 724 [158
P. 198], where he said: "It is entirely fair and permissible
to construe it
statute] as referring exclusively to acts or
omissions done or made directly with relation to the minor
child. No ease has been cited, and I have been able to find
none, iuvolving any other kind of an act of omis::;ion. :F'ol'
instance, one willfully commits lascivious aets in the presence
oE a child capable of comprehension, or tmvard suc:h a child;
or has immoral relations with a child; or does with relation to
the child any of the wry numerom: thi11gs that may directly
cause, tend to cause, or contribute to, its dependency. Such
acts or omissions are clearly within the scope of the statute.
But something done solely with relation to somebody else, in
no way directly affceting the child, may not fairly Lc held
within its scope. A.ncl it can make no difference in this connection whether the thing so done is immoral, as in the case at
bar, or absolutely free from blame."
[ 4] 'raking all the evidence as true together \Vith all the
inferellees to be dnl\Yll
it avpcars a>; a matter of law
that the only conduct committed in the presence of the 8-yearold child eonsistrd of Dr. Bernstrin 's presence in the home,
his being on the bed \Vith the child's mother whc11 the lights

seen on !Jis way to tlw shower
were
dres,;ed in his
and shoes. It cannot he said that
v.
this eondud falls withiu the rule set forth in
148
7:34 [307 P.2d 411], where it
was sai\1 that ""\ ease i;:; made out ,,,;hen the eyicl e1wc proves
acts on the part of the defendant which tend to cause or
encourage a minor to lead au . . . immoral life." [5] In
v.
117
410, 419
P .2d 3G5],
it was held that an ''immoral life'' is 11ot confined to sexual
matters but is something that is inimical to good
the welfare of the general public and
morals.
Even if we assume that the relationship between Dr. Bernstein
and Jliirs. Euns was
to
morals, the crime
is whether their conduct, as co!m!litted in the pre:;eHce of the
children, ·would cause or tend to cause the ehildnm to lead
idle, le>n1, dissolute or immoral lives. \Ve think it appears
as a matter of law that it would not, and that the trial court
was correct in setting aside the information for that reason.
There is no evidence that the acts of the defendant committed
in the presence of the child had any untoward effect ·whatsoeyer upon the child. And that is the crime with ·which we arc
here concerned.
[6] 'rhere is no merit to the People's argument that the
trial court substituted its judgment for that of the committing magistrate. It is the duty of the trial court when,
in its judgment, there is, as a matter of law, uo evidence which
tends to prove the offense charged in the information, to set it
aside.
[7] There is no merit to the People's argument that if
the information "inadequately" described the acts of Dr.
Bernstein and Mrs. Enns, the trial court should have ''permitted amendment" rather than dismissing the iuformatiou.
In this connnction the People rely upon section 1009 of the
Penal Code whi.eh provides in part that an amended complaint ''may be filed'' by the prosecuting attomey without
leave of court or that the court ''may order or permit an
amendmeut" of an information. It is apparently the People'::;
position that if the information was insuffiicent, it was the
duty of the court to on1er the prosecuting attorney to amend
it even though no effort was made on behalf of the People to
do so. But we are not here concerned with the problem of
whether the information states a public
but whether
the evidence presented at the preliminary examination is suffi-
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WILLIAM B. McKESSON, as District Attorney of the
of Los
v. JOSEPH M. LOWEHY, as Auditor of the County of Los
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should not be
which he was
is no
53071.
[2a, 2b] Id.- Compensation- ln,creas:mg
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his term of
and a county
of any elective county
officer should not be increased or diminished durthe term for which he was elected or within 90
prehis
to an ofllcer who is 1'ppointed to fill
but not to one who is elected to
the term; they do
a salary increase for an
ofl1cer elected to fill an
term where the increase is
adopted a sufficient time prior to the election to
with
any local
[3] Statutes-Construction-Legislative Intcnt.--Jt is a fundamental rule of statutory construction that the statute be
scrutinized in the
of the
intent.
See Cal.Jur.2d, Public
McK. Dig. References: [1, 2, 4-6] Public Officers, § 110(1); [3]
Statutes, § 114.

